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Abstract: Safety is THE priority in aviation. The 
reason is obvious: people's lives are at stake and 
this is ingrained in the industry (operators and 
manufacturers, regulation agencies). 
Instead of a wide description of the systems safety 
process, which is generally known and well 
documented, we will rather focus on a few important 
points, not always part of conventional wisdom. We 
intend to show that safety process is fully embedded 
in design, that the ubiquitous and magic number of 
10-9 is only a tiny part of the solution, the multiple 
dimension of the issues and the overall resilience of 
the process. 
Keywords: safety, aviation, system, architecture, 
resilience 
1. Introduction 
As mentioned in the abstract, safety is THE priority 
in aviation. Instead of a wide description of the 
systems safety process, which is generally known 
and well documented (see for system safety [1] or 
considerations in [2]), we will rather focus on a few 
important points. They will also help decipher our 
team logo: a balance with an aircraft viewpoint! 
 
Figure 1: logo of Airbus systems 
safety and reliability team 
 
 
2. The coconut (global safety picture) 
 
Flying is safe, thanks to a global ethics, and is 
shared at all levels of the aviation industry. Safety 
needs to be addressed everywhere: during airplane 
development obviously, but also in airline personnel 
excellence (pilots, commercial crew, maintenance 
personnel), air and airport traffic management, 
weather forecast, security, Flight Operation Quality 
Assurance, Airworthiness Authorities. These are all-
important links in the global safety chain. 
 
The airplane taken alone is safe when designed 
correctly (human factors consideration, lift capability, 
structural strength amongst many other parameters), 
with the adequate manufacturing quality, including 
the systems. Systems are not a significant cause of 
accidents. However, continuous care has to be taken 
to ensure that systems are properly designed, easy 
to maintain and failures handled adequately.  
 
Conversely, systems significantly help pilots in their 
tasks, at different levels, as expressed by this 
diagram (inspired from Reason's one [3]).  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Multiple safety layers 
 
Basic capability of the airplane and basic airmanship 
of the crew are the first barriers. Then, through 
Systems, the crew is informed and kept aware of the 
aircraft situation, performance and health status etc. 
Systems are able to warn the crew. Moreover, 
systems are able to add safety barriers. Some of 
these barriers are available on most modern 
airplanes: Traffic and Collision Avoidance System, 
Ground Proximity Warning System, or weather radar 
for example.  
Others are more specific to Airbus airplanes, like Fly-
by-Wire flight envelope protections [4]. These 
protections are still progressing; latest improvement 
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is an avoidance system in case of TCAS warning 
while autopilot is engaged (A/P TCAS mode [5]).  
 
3. Fully embedded in design 
 
Safety process starts by capturing safety 
requirements by applying a Functional Hazard 
Analysis (FHA) methodology.  
 
 
Catastrophic 
Failure condition which would result 
in multiple fatalities, usually with the 
loss of the aeroplane 
 
Hazardous 
Failure condition which would reduce 
the capability of the aeroplane or the 
ability of the crew to cope with 
adverse operating conditions to the 
extend that there would be: 
- A large reduction in safety margins 
or functional capabilities 
- Physical distress or excessive work 
load such that the flight crew cannot 
relied upon to perform their tasks 
accurately and completely; or 
- Serious or fatal injuries to a 
relatively small number of occupants 
other than flight crew 
 
Major 
Failure condition which would reduce 
the capability of the aeroplane or the 
ability of the crew to cope with 
adverse operating conditions to the 
extend that there would be for 
example: 
- A significant reduction in safety 
margin or functional capabilities; or 
- A significant increase in crew 
workload or in condition impairing 
crew efficiency; or 
- Discomfort to flight crew, or physical 
distress to passengers or cabin crew, 
possibly including injuries. 
 
Minor 
Failure condition which would not 
significantly reduce aeroplane safety 
and which involve crew actions that 
are well within their capabilities. 
Minor failure conditions may include, 
for example: 
- A slight reduction in safety margin 
or functional capabilities, 
- A slight increase in crew work load 
such as routine flight plan changes or
- Some physical discomfort to 
passengers or cabin crew. 
 
Figure 3: basic failure classification 
 
A top level FHA provides a global framework, and 
then an FHA is performed for each A/C function. 
Each of them (aircraft deceleration of ground, 
passenger accommodation…) is decomposed and 
for each sub-functions, failures are considered, the 
least being the consequences of the loss of the sub-
function and of an erratic behaviour.  
Although each FHA is part of a single System Safety 
Assessment (SSA), the function is evaluated taking 
into account all systems that participate to its 
implementation. Combinations with flight phases, 
and of such functional failures are also covered. 
Consequences are assessed at aircraft level and 
classified by the well-known Minor to Catastrophic 
terms.  
 
Based on this classification, safety objectives are 
determined (probability of the loss of this sub-
function shall be less than 10-5/Flight Hour (FH) for 
example if the classification is Major). Design of the 
airplane has then to comply with these requirements: 
from the overall systems architecture and installation 
routing, down to the definition of monitorings, 
reconfiguration logics, wiring connectors. 
 
Safety engineers are also usually embedded in 
design teams or at least in very close contact. This 
allows the safety requirements to be fully understood 
and taken into account by the design, and the safety 
documents to be relevant, thanks to deep system 
knowledge by the designers. In addition, safety 
engineers provide an independent line of reporting. 
Their independence in term of organisation is subject 
to a sufficient knowledge, allowing them to assess 
most of a design by themselves.  
  
 
4. Extremely Improbable 
 
A Catastrophic failure condition must be Extremely 
Improbable. It is always understood that its 
occurrence probability per flight hour must be less 
than a famous number: 10-9.  Meeting this number 
means that the risk on passenger life is reduced to a 
minimum. This is a strong statement from a 
passenger standpoint. However, the aviation 
community has the honesty to recognise that there is 
no such thing as zero risk and this way of designing 
airplane has proven to be successful. 
 
The magic and ubiquitous number is only one side of 
Extreme Improbability. Qualitative assessments are 
just as important.   
 
First of all, a single failure shall not be Catastrophic, 
whatever its probability. This is difficult to handle: 
what is a single failure? How to limit imagination and 
to prove that, as an example, a microprocessor will 
never output errors and in the meantime radiate 
energy that will fry some monitoring device? In 
practical terms, Regulation states that experienced 
engineering judgement may enable an assessment 
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that such a failure mode is not a practical possibility. 
If this is the case, it will not be considered. 
 
Again, when probabilities are multiplied, then the 
associated failures are supposed to occur 
independently. This is checked through the Common 
Mode Analysis. A typical common mode is the 
design of the system and its equipment. 
Development Assurance Level [6] is intended to 
minimise the occurrence of design errors to a level 
consistent with the risk, along with some 
dissimilarity, partitioning and so on. 
 
Putting aside fault-trees and failure diagrams, it is 
also assumed that some events may occur, without 
stated probability: a partial bulkhead rupture, an 
engine rotor burst whose debris strike the systems in 
the fuselage for example, as in picture. These are 
called Particular Risks.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: engine rotor burst trajectories 
 
Here again, a difficulty is to determine the analysis 
perimeter. Models for these risks are coming from 
experience of in-service events, or from theoretical 
studies. Even if we cannot prove that all future 
events are taken into account, these fixed cases are 
driving the system design and installation to 
separate redundant item as reasonably feasible. 
Cases occurred which were not in the model, but 
were survived by the airplane.  
 
A Particular Risk Assessment participates to 
Security evaluation: Survivability of Systems. It 
consists in ensuring that the airplane will survive to 
the destruction of all the systems within a physical 
sphere. This sphere is deemed representative of a 
small explosion; its diameter is consistent with the 
hole in the fuselage that is used to size the structure 
against depressurisation.  
 
The Zonal Safety Assessment piloted by safety 
engineers and systems installers will now check that 
our hypotheses are correct. It consists in inspecting 
the aircraft by experienced engineers with support of 
checklists. 
 
It is also important to recognize that flight and 
ground crews will make errors, even when well 
trained, experienced and rested individuals using 
well-designed systems. Therefore the designed 
cockpit and all other human-machine interface must 
enable the crew to manage errors that can be 
reasonably expected in service, assuming crews 
acting in good faith. 
 
 
5. Architecture and Integration 
 
Safety of an item cannot be fully assessed without 
taking into account its effect on other systems and 
then on the airplane. It is thus required for safety 
assessment to go down to the reconfiguration logic 
embedded in the 527th line of code and to the 3rd 
bearing inside the actuator, but also to go up to the 
functional interface between systems, to the crew 
awareness and the effect on the airplane trajectory. 
Control surfaces and some aircraft performances 
have to be sized to cover failure cases. More and 
more we have also to think about the whole air traffic 
management system and to navigation performance 
and integrity. 
 
Particular Risk Assessment addresses on one side 
the physical distance between a given wire and the 
trajectory of debris or the location of a heat source 
and on another side overall airplane effect. They 
have a direct impact on structure architecture; hence 
they must be taken into account very early in the 
design process to reduce the risk of late 
modification, and proper trade-off have to be made 
to avoid heavy design solutions. 
 
Safety activity involves multiple disciplines: all 
systems (avionics, engine, mechanical systems, air, 
fuel, cabin, design assurance) engineering, flight 
physics (handling quality, performance, loads), 
structure (capability to resist a system failure or a 
shock from a bird for example), system installation 
engineering (including DMU (Digital Mock-Up)), the 
world of airplane operations: maintenance 
engineering, human factors, flight test pilots and 
engineers, and of course the management. These 
disciplines are involved through their respective 
organisations. 
 
It is thus mandatory for the safety engineer to 
integrate most aircraft disciplines and aircraft and 
systems architecture. 
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6. Mission assurance 
 (Operational Reliability and Safety) 
 
A failure has some likelihood to occur on a flight 
departing its “home”, to an airport without available 
spare. In this case, we will try to take benefit of 
existing safety margins to allow the dispatch of the 
airplane with a known failure on board. This is the 
purpose of the Master Minimum Equipment List 
(MMEL). This Airbus document provides a list of 
equipment that can be failed prior to dispatch, often 
associated with some mitigation means; the airlines 
are deriving their own rule, the MEL, from it. 
 
 
Figure 5: Getting to grips with the MEL 
 
We are taking benefit of the redundancy level: quite 
often systems are designed with an additional 
computer on top of what is absolutely needed to 
meet the famous 10-9. The decision to add a flying 
spare is difficult to take: this is additional cost for the 
airplane, and weight. This has to be balanced with 
the operational need of the airlines. It is also 
possible to ask for maintenance checks, to uncover 
some potentially existing hidden failures. 
 
To put an item in this MMEL list, first criterion is to do 
as much as we can to mitigate the risk; then we have 
to check that safety objectives are still reached. 
 
 
7. Safety and certification 
 
Certification major objective is to ensure safety. It 
comes quite naturally then that safety assessments 
are a means to show compliance with certification 
requirements, most notably the famous 25.1309 [7], 
plus some others. This sets a minimum standard 
common to all aircraft manufacturers.  
 
On top of it, two kinds of margins are taken: some to 
improve the availability of systems and then to allow 
dispatch with failed equipment (MMEL). Others are 
more the result of a given aircraft manufacturer 
history and belief. For example, Boeing and Airbus 
Fly-by-Wire systems are tolerant to some design 
errors, but not exactly the same [8, 9]. The 
usefulness of these margins is not proven … neither 
the contrary, which makes it very difficult to get rid of 
them once they have been introduced. 
 
As often in the safety process, we have to ensure a 
safe baseline, to then balance safety margins within 
the aviation business: airplane operability, weight, 
recurring and maintenance cost among others. This 
requires competencies, but also a strong decision 
making process. 
 
 
8. Life after Type Certification 
 
When the airplane gets its Type Certificate, there are 
both a feeling of relief, but also some uneasiness: 
excitation to meet the milestone is no more present 
and activities are going to be different from plain 
development. On safety side, this new era is filled 
with small developments (modifications) and also 
with in-service events. Airlines regulation requires 
them to report any event that is more or less safety-
related. Airbus has to assess them. This needs a lot 
of balance!  
 
First of all, when an event occurs with some safety 
concern, the first and most common reaction would 
be to ask for all airplanes to be grounded while a 
comprehensive study of the event is done. However, 
no airplane would be flying if this were the rule. So, 
there is a need to think fast and smart to understand 
most of the event and to find a way to mitigate the 
risk.  
 
And here we enter a second exercise that is to 
balance practicality of what will be proposed to 
airlines and potential safety margins in the design. 
We must keep the fleet safe. Fortunately there are 
always some margins (like MMEL) that we can 
leverage to reduce customer burden. 
 
 
Figure 6: In-service aircraft 
 
A third exercise is to draw lessons from in-service 
events. We can see that airplanes are not operated 
as we engineers have in mind; we also sometimes 
discover system behaviours that were unexpected. 
 Page 4/6 
We thus need to improve our methods, to integrate 
this experience in future design (for both safety and 
operational reliability), and also to think about the 
whole flying fleet to wonder if a given event is not 
revealing a weakness on another system or another 
airplane type.  
 
 
9. Resilience 
 
There is some resilience in both the airplane and in 
the process. Airplane resilience is shown by the 
cases which occurred, which were not design cases 
but which were covered by the global margins that 
are taken. The pit-bull on the loose in a cargo bay is 
a typical example. This is not a design case, but it 
occurred once and precautions to separate 
resources were effective in protecting essential 
systems. Another example is the A300B hit by a 
missile in Baghdad [10]. It was saved by the 
extraordinary skills of the crew and some inherent 
characteristics of the airplane.  
 
A breakthrough may have been done on A380 with 
the introduction of flight controls electrical actuation 
[9, 11]. Covering engine rotor burst is the safety 
requirement that lead to their introduction. On top of 
this (and of the weight saving performed) electrical 
actuation could bring some benefit against events 
which are not in-line with the model on engine rotor 
burst that is used in the aviation community. It is also 
a dissimilar power source, fundamentally different 
from hydraulic system. Hopefully, we will never 
benefit of this resilience, but who knows? 
 
In term of process resilience, the aviation world is 
continuously learning. First of all, the incidents and 
accidents that are occurring must be reported. As 
per [12], airplane manufacturer must have a system 
for collecting, investigating and analysing information 
related to occurrences that might cause adverse 
effects on the safety on the airplane. This system 
must be made available to all operators of the 
airplane. If a potential unsafe condition is identified, it 
must be reported within 72 hours to EASA. It must 
be analysed, and the Authority may mandate actions 
such as a modification or an operational limitation. 
When the regulation is found insufficient, then it 
evolves. New regulation may be required on existing 
and already delivered airplane if safety benefits are 
deemed significant. 
 
The regulation is also updated to address new 
technologies. Regulation is thus very stringent (we 
have to comply) and versatile, constantly evolving. 
 
On top of the mandatory reporting system for all 
significant events according to the regulation, 
voluntary incident reporting system are also in place 
in several countries. The aim is to collect and 
disseminate data to track and address potential or 
actual safety issues. These "Safety Management 
Systems" are confidential and non-punitive ("just 
culture" is often used) and useful to identify potential 
precursors to accident [13]. Dissemination of 
information is done several ways, including by public 
domain by such publication as the Journal of Flight 
Safety Foundation and the Airbus Safety Magazine 
[14]. 
 
 
10. Conclusion: What about the future? 
 
Apart from workload issues and the health 
consequences of the inherent paranoia of all safety 
engineers, the situation appears bright. This is not a 
reason to keep going without any changes. A 
methodological step has been taken with A380: a 
significant formalisation effort has been done, which 
leads to more rigor in the assessment; the use of 
Digital Mock-Up changed also significantly the 
process for PRA and ZSA. 
 
In the future we can expect some process 
improvement thanks to all the models that will be 
available (models of system, of airplane physics, of 
systems installation), to their interconnection, and to 
new analysis methods such as formal proof [9, 15]. A 
better confidence in the result, obtained more 
efficiently is at stake. 
 
Some progress is also foreseen without needing a 
high level of technology improvement in the area of 
getting more synthetic documents and leveraging 
operational reliability on the safety process and data. 
 
 
Figure 7: What about the future? 
 
Another area of progress is to evaluate the trend of 
the aviation industry to identify future threats and 
future opportunities (new technologies that could 
provide safety benefit).  
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13. Glossary 
 
A/C  Aircraft 
A/P  Autopilot 
DAL  Development Assurance Level 
DMU  Digital Mock-Up 
EASA  European Aviation Safety Agency 
FAA  Federal Aviation Authority 
FHA  Functional Hazard Analysis  
GPWS  Ground Proximity Warning System  
MEL  Minimum Equipment List (airline document)  
MMEL  Master Minimum Equipment List (manufacturer 
document) 
PRA  Particular Risk Assessment 
SSA  System Safety Assessment  
TCAS  Traffic and Collision Avoidance System 
ZSA  Zonal Safety Assessment 
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